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I. INTRODUCTION 
Among law and economics scholars it has long been a settled matter 
that vertical integration—whether partial integration by contract or full 
integration by merger—is typically procompetitive (or, at the very least, 
competitively ambiguous, and problematic in only very limited, stylized, 
and theoretical circumstances).1  One after another, old case law and 
outdated economic theories of vertical harm have crumbled, effectively 
moving what was once a judicial stance of per se illegality to one of near 
per se legality for such conduct.2  Even vertical mergers—the ultimate 
vertical restraint—have been consistently viewed by scholars and courts 
as generally procompetitive, supported by substantial empirical literature.3 
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 1. See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L. J. 
INDUS. ORG. 639, 648 (2005) (“In reviewing this literature, two features immediately stand out: First, 
there is a paucity of support for the proposition that vertical restraints/vertical integration are likely to 
harm consumers. . . .  Second, a far greater number of studies found that the use of vertical restraints 
in the particular context studied improved welfare unambiguously . . . .”); see also D. Bruce Hoffman, 
Acting Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Credit Suisse 2018 
Washington Perspectives Conference: Vertical Merger Enforcement at the FTC 4 (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1304213/hoffman_vertical_merger_s
peech_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2NS-C2SK] (“To summarize, overall there is a broad consensus 
in competition policy and economic theory that the majority of vertical mergers are beneficial because 
they reduce costs and increase the intensity of interbrand competition.  That consensus has support in 
the empirical research.”). 
 2. See Daniel Sokol, The Transformation on Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of 
Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1008 (2013) (discussing the shift from per se 
illegality to per se legality in vertical mergers). 
 3. See infra Section IV.B; David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Comment: Is There New Thinking on 
Vertical Mergers?, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 917, 921 (1994) (“Post-Chicago analysis demonstrates the 
theoretical possibility of harmful vertical mergers.  By itself, however, this is inadequate to justify 
aggressive antitrust review of these transactions.”); see also OECD, Competition Policy Roundtables, 
Vertical Mergers, 239 (2007), https://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/39891031.pdf 
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Increasingly, however, vertical conduct of all sorts, including vertical 
mergers, has come under increased scrutiny,4 most recently driven by 
broadly “populist” antitrust concerns around big tech platforms.5  Much of 
the new opprobrium for vertical conduct has come from the likes of 
presidential hopefuls, journalists, political pundits, and activists.6  In 
general, this more “political” opposition to vertical restraints and vertical 
integration seems to be rooted in a reflexive opposition to “structural 
favoritism”—to business models that entail some degree of prioritization 
or discrimination.7  But this ignores the basic economics of the firm and 
longstanding concepts like joint production, information costs, asset 
specificity, and entrepreneurial judgment, which can lead to advantages 
for consumers and for competition from the adoption of superficial market 
restraints, including the vertical integration of some—but not other—input 
and output providers.8 
More concerning, however, a fair amount of the resurgence in 
opposition to vertical restraints and mergers has come from academic 
economic quarters.9  Surprisingly, this criticism of vertical conduct also 
 
[https://perma.cc/W6QX-PJ5N] (“[V]ertical mergers merit a stronger presumption of being efficient 
than do horizontal mergers, and should be allowed to proceed except in those few cases where 
convincing, fact-based evidence relating to the specific circumstances of the vertical merger indicates 
likely competitive harm.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 
1982 (2018) [hereinafter Salop, Invigorating] (noting that “action . . . to modernize vertical merger 
enforcement policy” requires “recognizing the substantial potential harms from vertical and 
complementary product mergers”). 
 5. See, e.g., Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c 
[https://perma.cc/8TG3-ZLBS] (“That’s why my administration will make big, structural changes to 
the tech sector to promote more competition—including breaking up Amazon, Facebook, and 
Google.”); see also Emily Craig, Vestager Considers Shifting Burden of Proof for Big Tech, GLOBAL 
COMP. REV. (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b7159a3d-ae2e-4e87 
-ba37-e59f9200c2c4 [https://perma.cc/6E2H-MAJS] (“EU competition commissioner Margrethe 
Vestager is considering shifting the standard of proof onto large technology companies to prove the 
effects of their conduct are not anticompetitive.”). 
 6. Id.  
 7. See Warren, supra note 5 (“But where the value of the company came from its network, 
reformers recognized that ownership of a network and participating on the network caused a conflict 
of interest.  Instead of nationalizing these industries—as other countries did—Americans in the 
Progressive Era decided to ensure that these networks would not abuse their power by charging higher 
prices . . . and favoring some over others.  We required a structural separation between the network 
and other businesses, and also demanded that the network offer fair and non-discriminatory service.”). 
 8. See infra Section II.B.  
 9. See, e.g., Salop, Invigorating, supra note 4, at 1982-84; see also Carl Shapiro, Protecting 
Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control, Tech Titans, Labor Markets, 33 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 69, 69 (2019) (“[E]vidence is mounting that the largest US firms account for a growing share 
of economic activity, and that profits and price/cost margins at these firms have grown sharply in 
recent decades.  Meanwhile, the economic might of the largest tech firms seems to grow without 
bound.  Have our antitrust laws and institutions failed us?”); Jonathan B. Baker et al., Five Principles 
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misunderstands or ignores fundamental economic concepts. 
One prominent line of criticism of vertical mergers, for example, notes 
an overlap of vertical mergers with vertical contracts, and proposes to 
prohibit or significantly deter vertical integration by merger because it 
inherently leads to competitive problems that either do not exist or can 
more easily be corrected in vertical contracts.10  But the choice between 
merger and contract for firms is not so simple, especially in highly 
dynamic industries in which effective competition often demands both 
process and product innovation.  In particular, the management of 
intangible information assets—often the crucial inputs in dynamic, high-
tech firms—may not be as readily (or at all) accomplished by contract as 
by internal coordination.11  In the face of extreme informational 
uncertainties and the need for the inherently uncertain exercise of 
entrepreneurial judgment and dynamic capabilities (which reside in a 
firm’s individual decisionmakers, corporate culture, and collective ability 
to implement novel business processes),12 contracts cannot always 
replicate the competitive advantages of integration through merger. 
This narrow view of vertical integration thus ignores and threatens to 
undermine dynamic competition and innovation.  Indeed, if we take the 
organization theory and business strategy literature on the organization of 
firms in dynamic industries seriously,13 the status quo might even be over-
 
for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, 33 ANTITRUST 12, 17 (“[M]odern economic analysis does 
not support a relaxed approach to vertical merger review and enforcement.”). 
 10. See infra Section II.A.; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Hearings on Competition and Consumer 
Protection in the 21st Century: FTC Hearing #5: Vertical Merger Analysis and the Role of the 
Consumer Welfare Standard in U.S. Antitrust Law, Presentation Slides, at 24 (Nov. 1, 2018), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_5_georgetown_slides.pdf 
[hereinafter FTC Hearing #5 Presentation Slides] (“Efficiencies often can be achieved by vertical 
contracts, without the potential anticompetitive harms from merger.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, DRAFT JOINT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 6 (Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1233741/download [https://perma.cc/YU3S-9Q9Y] 
[hereinafter DRAFT JOINT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (“The effects of the elimination of double 
marginalization may be lower if, prior to the merger, the merging parties already engaged in 
contracting that aligned their incentives, for example by using a two-part tariff with a fixed fee and 
low unit prices that incorporate no, or a small, margin.”). 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. See D. Daniel Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1357, 
1371-73 (2018). 
 13. See Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Complementarity and External Linkages: The 
Strategies of the Large Firms in Biotechnology, 38 J. INDUS. ECON. 361, 374 (1990) (noting that in 
R&D heavy industries “[t]he locus of innovation should be thought of as a ‘network’ of inter-
organizational relations” as opposed to focusing solely on single-firm boundaries); see also Michael 
G. Jacobides & Stephan Billinger, Designing the Boundaries of the Firm: From “Make, Buy, or Ally” 
to the Dynamic Benefits of Vertical Architecture, 17 ORG. SCI. 249, 250 (2006) (“Thus, vertical 
architectures shape the pattern of transactional choices, and we find that they have important systemic 
properties that go well beyond transactional alignment.”); Gautam Ahuja & Riitta Katila, 
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enforcing, and leading to the deterrence of innovative, procompetitive 
mergers.  It is insufficient merely to advert to potential price effects or 
innovation effects on foreclosed competitors or input providers, and there 
truncate the analysis.  A proper evaluation of the competitive effects of 
vertical conduct requires an assessment of industrywide increases in 
innovation and of quality improvements that may accompany superficial 
price increases or localized constraints on innovation.14  Without this it is 
impossible to conclude that such conduct is anticompetitive. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  First, we examine the academic calls 
for stronger presumptions against vertical mergers based on, among other 
things, the alleged substitutability of contract for merger as a means of 
vertical integration, and the alleged equivalence of harms that arise from 
vertical and horizontal mergers.  We analyze these claims on their own 
terms before proceeding in the next part to survey the economic literature 
that undermines the foundation of these arguments.  We then proceed to 
analyze the critical differences between horizontal and vertical mergers 
that makes conflation of these two distinct methods of business 
combination impossible to truly treat as analytically equivalent.  Next, we 
discuss the mistake of substituting static analysis for a more thorough 
dynamic analysis, particularly in industries marked by fluid product cycles 
and flexible business models.  Finally, we conclude. 
II. VERTICAL MERGERS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 
Vertical mergers entail the combination into a single firm of 
companies operating at different levels of the same supply or production 
chain.15  Examples of such vertical integrations are manifold throughout 
the economy.  Indeed, it is even arguably the case that virtually every firm 
could be considered vertically integrated to one degree or another insofar 
as it provides some of its own operation’s inputs (e.g., a restaurant also 
 
Technological Acquisitions and the Innovation Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal 
Study, 22 STRAT. MGMT. J. 197, 197 (2001) (examining “the impact of acquisitions on the subsequent 
innovation performance of acquiring firms”); Claudio Wolter & Francisco M. Veloso, The Effects of 
Innovation on Vertical Structure: Perspectives on Transaction Costs and Competences, 33 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 586, 601 (2008) (noting that it is “relevant for [firms] to learn how to organize their firms’ 
vertical structure so as to become innovators,” and in particular how “[u]nderstanding what kind of 
products, activities, and services to outsource prior to a determined innovative regime coming into 
place . . . can lead to long-term competitive advantages and, consequently, survival”). 
 14. See infra Part V.  
 15. See, e.g., DRAFT JOINT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 1 n.2 (“Vertical 
mergers combine firms or assets that operate at different stages of the same supply chain. . . .  In 
describing a vertical relationship, the stage closer to final consumers (such as a distributor, retailer, or 
finished goods manufacturer) is termed ‘downstream,’ and the stage farther from final consumers 
(such as a supplier, wholesaler, or input manufacturer) is termed ‘upstream.’”). 
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performs its own accounting in-house) or operates its own logistics 
systems (e.g., a manufacturer also owns and manages its own trucks and 
makes its own deliveries).  In some industries, many firms are vertically 
integrated along all levels of production: many petroleum firms are 
vertically integrated from exploration and production, to refining and retail 
fuel stations;16 many restaurants are vertically integrated “from farm to 
table.”17  At the same time, many retail fuel stations and restaurants operate 
independently, purchasing their inputs from suppliers, contracting out 
their logistics, and competing effectively against vertically integrated 
firms in the same market.18 
The ubiquity of such arrangements and the multifarious ways in which 
such integrations can improve firms’ operations and increase efficiency 
have generally led courts and enforcers to view vertical mergers with far 
less skepticism than their horizontal counterparts.19  Nonetheless, in some 
quarters there is dissatisfaction with the state of vertical merger policy in 
the United States. 
In 2018, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted hearings to 
look at the current state of competition law.20  One of the themes that 
emerged was a dissatisfaction with both the current 1984 vertical merger 
guidelines as well as with the state of vertical merger enforcement. 
In his introductory remarks at the hearing on vertical mergers, FTC 
Commissioner Noah Phillips asserted that the current vertical merger 
 
 16. See, e.g., David J. Teece, Vertical Integration and Vertical Divestiture in the U.S. Petroleum 
Industry 75-81 (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 300, 1976), https://www.gsb 
.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/vertical-integration-vertical-divestiture-us-petroleum-
industry [https://perma.cc/ZHH2-PTQC] (discussing the comprehensive vertical integration of the 
U.S. oil industry and its impact on competition). 
 17. See, e.g., Cindy Elliot, Supply Chain Integration Fuels New Farm-to-Table Movement, ESRI 
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.esri.com/about/newsroom/publications/wherenext/supply-chain 
-integration-fuels-new-farm-to-table-movement/ [https://perma.cc/LEV9-5VQB] (discussing the 
vertical integration inherent in “farm-to-table” restaurants). 
 18. See, e.g., Selling America’s Fuel, NACS (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.convenience.org 
/Topics/Fuels/Who-Sells-Americas-Fuel [https://perma.cc/G2B6-DXZW] (noting that approximately 
80% of the fuel sold in the US is vended at convenience stores that are unlikely to be integrated with 
oil companies). 
 19. See Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the GCR Live 
8th Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum: Vertical Merger Policy: What Do We Know and Where Do 
We Go?, at 4 (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1455670 
/wilson_-_vertical_merger_speech_at_gcr_2-1-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/9225-LY44] (“[W]e know 
that competitive harm is less likely to occur in a vertical merger than in a horizontal one.”). 
 20. See Joe Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Remarks of Chairman Joe Simons: 
Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (Sept. 13, 2018), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1409925/opening_remarks_of_joe_simons 
_hearings1georgetown_sept2018_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/44TF-V9ZJ] (introducing the FTC 
hearings).  
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guidelines “are outdated and do not reflect current agency practice,”21 and 
Paul Yde commented that “nobody pays any attention to the ‘84 guidelines 
anymore.”22  Critics of the 1984 guidelines argued that they “[d]o not 
reflect current economic learning” and do not reflect actual agency 
practice.23  Professor Carl Shapiro, for example, argues that the current 
guidelines do not address unilateral effects, and “there has been a lot of 
learning and a complete shift in agency enforcement related to unilateral 
[effects]” since the guidelines were published.24 
Spurred on by such concerns, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
FTC have announced new draft Joint Vertical Merger Guidelines.25  
Although the draft guidelines do not adopt most of the critics’ suggestions, 
they do move away from the existing guidelines to some degree.  For 
example, the draft guidelines remove the 1984 guidelines’ prefatory 
language, suggesting that vertical mergers may be less concerning than 
horizontal mergers.26  They also specifically recognize Post-Chicago 
theories of potential vertical harm arising from foreclosure, raising rivals’ 
costs, and information sharing.27 
Although it is doubtlessly correct that the 1984 guidelines do not 
reflect the latest economic knowledge, it is by no means clear that this has 
been a problem—or that a new set of guidelines would not create even 
greater problems.28  Indeed, as the former DOJ Antitrust Division Acting 
Assistant Attorney General, Sharis Pozen, remarked at the FTC’s hearing, 
the possible disconnect between the current guidelines and agency 
 
 21. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: 
FTC Hearing #5: Vertical Merger Analysis and the Role of the Consumer Welfare Standard in U.S. 
Antitrust Law, Transcript, at 7 (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public 
_events/1415284/ftc_hearings_session_5_transcript_11-1-18_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9WB-T7BS] 
[hereinafter FTC Hearing #5 Transcript]. 
 22. Id. at 109 (statement of Paul Yde, Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer).  
 23. FTC Hearing #5 Presentation Slides, supra note 10, at 9.  
 24. FTC Hearing #5 Transcript, supra note 21, at 57 (statement of Carl Shapiro, Professor, 
University of California-Berkeley).   
 25. DRAFT JOINT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 15. 
 26. Compare id. § 1(a)-(c) (“Vertical mergers, however, also raise distinct considerations”) with 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (1984), https://www.justice.gov 
/atr/page/file/1175141/download [https://perma.cc/65DA-CEQ2] [hereinafter NON-HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES] (“Although nonhorizontal mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to 
create competitive problems, they are not invariably innocuous.”). 
 27. DRAFT JOINT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 5(a)–(b).  The draft 
guidelines do not, however, take up the call to adopt an “evasion of price regulation” theory.  See 
Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and 
an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1, 39 (2015); Michael H. Riordan 
& Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 
561 (1995). 
 28. See FTC Hearing #5 Transcript, supra note 21, at 148 (statement of Sharis Pozen, Partner, 
Clifford Chance). 
2020] THE FATAL ECONOMIC FLAWS 929 
learning and practice is of little concern: “I do not feel uncertainty because 
I do not have vertical guidelines.  I have uncertainty because I do not know 
what the state of play is right now, particularly at the Department of Justice 
on these issues.”29 
A. The Foundational Justifications for Enhanced Vertical Merger 
Enforcement 
Nonetheless, several scholars—most notably, economist Steven 
Salop—have been energetic in their criticism of the current nonhorizontal 
merger guidelines as well as the general state of vertical merger 
enforcement.30  Importantly, not only has Salop asserted that the guidelines 
fail to reflect actual agency enforcement, he has also argued that both the 
guidelines and the vertical merger enforcement practices at the FTC and 
DOJ fail to reflect the current state of economic learning concerning 
vertical conduct.31  Moreover, his current recommendations are more 
vigorous than the recommendations for reform he has offered in the past.32  
In 1995, for example, he argued for more enforcement, but “[b]ecause of 
the potential for efficiency benefits, it is appropriate in many cases to adopt 
a decision structure that requires the complaining party to demonstrate a 
significant likelihood of injury to consumers; harm to competitors is 
insufficient.”33  Today, by contrast, Professor Salop argues for a 
“reasonable probability” of consumer harm evidentiary standard,34 
recommends anti-merger presumptions based on competitor harms,35 and 
 
 29. Id. at 148; see also James Langenfeld, The Need to Revise the U.S. Non-Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, in On-Topic: What is Trump Antitrust?, CONCURRENCE, Nov. 2016, at 51, 51 
(“Unfortunately, the U.S. antitrust agencies have not updated their Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
for 32 years, even though . . . the antitrust agencies have revised the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 6 
times over the last 48 years [and] the competition agencies . . . have challenged a number of major 
mergers between firms that do not directly compete with one another . . . .  It has been argued that [the 
Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines] should not be updated because there is not a sufficient consensus 
about how to analyze them, [and] because a public statement about merger enforcement would 
encourage more active enforcement than merited . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 30. See, e.g., Salop & Culley, supra note 27, at 3–4. 
 31. Id. (“Those Guidelines are now woefully out of date.  They do not reflect current economic 
thinking about vertical mergers.  Nor do they reflect current agency practice.  Nor do they reflect the 
analytic approach taken in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Salop, Invigorating, supra note 4, at 1982–84 (“The 1984 Non-Horizontal Guidelines are out-of-
date.”). 
 32. Compare Riordan & Salop, supra note 27, at 564, with FTC Hearing #5 Presentation Slides, 
supra note 10, at 24. 
 33. Riordan & Salop, supra note 27, at 564. 
 34. FTC Hearing #5 Presentation Slides, supra note 10, at 34. 
 35. Id. at 32 (“When a vertical merger enables the merged firm to raise its rivals’ costs, 
competition is lessened substantially.”). 
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adopts a strong presumption against efficiencies.36 
Foundational to his criticisms, Salop argues (and believes current 
enforcement practices fail to recognize) that vertical mergers can result in 
harms that are analytically equivalent to harms that arise from 
impermissible horizontal mergers: 
There are similar inherent market power concerns that arise from vertical 
mergers in oligopoly markets just as they arise from horizontal mergers.  
Consider the common vertical merger scenario where the upstream 
merging firm was competing in the pre-merger world to sell inputs to the 
unintegrated downstream firms that compete with its future downstream 
merger partner.  In this scenario, that upstream firm was effectively a 
pre-merger “partner” of these unintegrated downstream competitors.  
After merging, the upstream firm would obtain foreclosure incentives to 
raise their costs and prices.  This is analogous to the price-raising effects 
of a hypothetical horizontal merger between the downstream merging 
firm and its competitors.  Indeed, it is analytically similar if not 
equivalent to a standard unilateral effects model.  Thus, there is an 
inherent horizontal effect even in this common vertical merger 
scenario.37 
According to this criticism, the traditional explanations for the laxer 
treatment38 of vertical (as opposed to horizontal) mergers are faulty: 
[T]he Chicago School’s skepticism toward . . . the competitive risks of 
vertical mergers . . . rests on three main claims: (1) foreclosure is illusory 
because vertical mergers simply realign vertical relationships rather than 
reduce supply; (2) anticompetitive foreclosure generally would not be 
profitable; and (3) vertical mergers are invariably efficient, particularly 
because of elimination of double marginalization.  However, modern 
economic analysis demonstrates that these theories do not provide a valid 
basis for such limited enforcement.  Instead, modern analysis shows that 
competitive harm can in fact result from vertical mergers when markets 
are imperfectly competitive . . . .  [Thus,] the first two claims never had 
a strong economic basis and have been steadily and powerfully debunked 
by economists, while the third cannot carry the burden to support 
 
 36. Id. at 24 (“Merging parties must provide rigorous explanation, identifying specific pre-merger 
impediments that are not themselves anticompetitive.  They must explain why [these] impediments 
[are] solved by the merger.”). 
 37. Steven C. Salop, Modernizing the Vertical Merger Guidelines, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., July 
24, 2019, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/modernizing-the-vertical-merger-
guidelines/ (emphasis added). 
 38. According to Professor Salop:  
Since that time, vertical merger challenges have been infrequent.  From 1994 to 2016, U.S. 
agencies have challenged only fifty-two mergers that involved vertical integration, and 
some of these also involved horizontal overlaps.  In merger enforcement involving mergers 
with both vertical and horizontal components, the FTC and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) typically focused only on the horizontal overlaps. 
Salop, Invigorating, supra note 4, at 1964–65. 
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nonenforcement.39 
Further, a fundamental basis for Professor Salop’s claims regarding 
heightened scrutiny of vertical mergers is his contention that virtually 
anything—any efficiencies—that can be realized by merger can typically 
be created by contract.40  He relies on Coase to support his argument: 
“[Placing] the burden of production for showing that efficiencies are 
merger-specific on the merging parties, not the plaintiff[,] . . . makes 
economic sense for vertical mergers.  As emphasized by Ronald Coase, 
vertical contracts can be a good substitute for vertical integration, absent 
significant transactions costs.”41 
Salop thus argues that the existence of a contract solution to firm 
problems can generate the same sorts of efficiencies as when firms opt to 
merge (and because, as noted above, vertical mergers create the same 
inherent risks as horizontal mergers); therefore, it follows that enforcers 
and courts should generally adopt a policy against vertical mergers 
relative to the status quo: 
Efficiencies often can be achieved by vertical contracts, without the 
potential anticompetitive harms from merger.  In that vertical restraints 
are characterized as “just” vertical integration “by contract,” then 
claimed efficiencies in problematical mergers might be achieved with 
non-merger contracts that do not raise the same anticompetitive 
concerns.42 
The upshot of these criticisms is, at bottom, a preference for more 
enforcement against vertical integration over the status quo.43  If the 
intellectual justification for the current enforcement regime is 
systematically biased against recognizing the true harms from vertical 
mergers, it follows that it is highly likely that enforcers will miss a 
significant number of vertical mergers that result in harm, and, therefore, 
that the regime needs to be adjusted to generate a relatively larger amount 
of enforcement activity. 




 39. Id. at 1966. 
 40. See Steven C. Salop, The AT&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled Professor 
Nash, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 459, 468 (2018) [hereinafter Salop, AT&T]. 
 41. Id.  
 42. FTC Hearing #5 Presentation Slides, supra note 10, at 24. 
 43. See, e.g., Salop, Invigorating, supra note 4, at 1969 (“But the market conditions under which 
the theory [supporting pro-vertical merger presumptions] applies are far too narrow to create a 
procompetitive enforcement or legal presumption.”). 
932 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
made a similar point: 
[I]t is important to recognize that, while we must assume that a vertical 
merger will lead to the elimination of double marginalization [“EDM”], 
this does not imply that EDM is merger-specific.  That is a factual 
question that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  For example, if 
other firms in the industry have managed to eliminate double 
marginalization through contract, perhaps by using two-part tariffs or 
other non-linear pricing schemes, the merging firms might well be able 
to do likewise.  In that case, EDM is not merger specific and should not 
be credited as an efficiency in the merger analysis.  In the AT&T/Time 
Warner case, my analysis credited EDM as merger-specific.44 
B. The Foundational Problems with the Foundational Justifications 
It is true that, where contracts are observed, they are likely more 
efficient than mergers.  But, by the same token, it is also true that where 
mergers are observed, they are likely more efficient than contracts.  
Indeed, as we discuss in the next part, the entire reason for integration is 
efficiency relative to what could be done by contract—this is the essence 
of the so-called “make-or-buy” decision.45  A firm that decides to buy its 
own warehouse has determined that doing so is more efficient than renting 
warehouse space.  Some of these efficiencies can be measured and 
quantified (e.g., carrying costs of ownership vs. the cost of rent), but many 
efficiencies cannot be easily measured or quantified (e.g., layout of the 
facility or site security).  Under Professor Salop’s reasoning, the benefits 
of owning a warehouse can be achieved often by renting warehouse space.  
But the fact that many firms using warehouses own some space and rent 
some space indicates that the make-or-buy decision is often unique to each 
firm’s idiosyncratic situation. 
And there is no reason to presume in any given situation that the 
outcome from contracting would be the same as from merging. The two 
are, quite simply, different bargaining environments, each with a different 
risk allocation, different accounting treatment, different tax consequences, 
etc.  Even if the parties accomplished “identical” outcomes, they would 
not, in fact, be identical. 
Meanwhile, what if the reason for failure to contract, or the reason to 
prefer merger, has nothing to do with efficiency?  What if there were no 
 
 44. Carl Shapiro, Testing Vertical Mergers for Input Foreclosure, ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV. 6 (June 7, 2019), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2019)75 
/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/GNC8-NZ65].  
 45. Id. 
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anticompetitive aim, but instead there were a tax advantage?46  What if one 
of the parties just wanted a larger firm in order to satisfy the CEO’s ego?  
That these are not cognizable efficiencies under antitrust law is clear.  But 
the adoption of a presumption of equivalence between contract and merger 
would entail their incorporation into antitrust law in much the same way, 
except in the negative.  In other words, if the assumption is that contract 
and merger are equally efficient unless proven otherwise, but the law 
adopts a presumption against mergers—which can be rebutted only with 
highly burdensome evidence of net efficiency gain—this effectively 
deputizes antitrust law to enforce a preconceived notion of merger 
appropriateness that does not turn on efficiencies. 
In truth, and as we discuss at length below, both of the critics’ 
foundational claims—that vertical and horizontal mergers have equivalent 
effects and that vertical contracting can accomplish the same ends as 
vertical mergers (and at lower risk)—are faulty.  First, while it may 
sometimes be true that the mechanism of harm is the same, because a 
vertical merger removes only a potential competitor, while a horizontal 
merger removes an actual competitor, the risk of harm is not the same.  By 
the same token, the mechanisms are not always the same, and the 
imposition of harm resulting from a vertical merger often requires an 
additional step, which may or may not come about.  This further attenuates 
the risk of harm. 
More fundamentally, however, while there are surely some situations 
in which contractual restraints might be able to achieve similar 
organizational and efficiency gains as a merger, the practical realities of 
achieving not just greater efficiency, but a whole host of non-efficiency-
related, yet nonetheless valid, goals are rarely equivalent between the two.  
For example, it may be that the parties don’t know what they don’t know 
to such an extent that a contract would be too costly because it was too 
incomplete.  Incomplete contracts and ambiguous control and ownership 
rights are not ongoing issues with a merger like they are for contractual 
arrangements.  There is no basis for assuming that the structure of a 
merger and a contract would be identical.  In the same way, there is no 
basis for assuming that the knowledge transfer that would result from a 
merger would be the same as that which would result from a contract—
and in ways that the parties could specify or reliably calculate in advance.  
Knowing that the prospect for knowledge “synergies” would be higher 
 
 46. See, e.g., FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS: BUSINESS 
AND LABOR PRACTICES 35 (1978) (“Both vertical integration and tying arrangements have been used 
to avoid or reduce certain categories of taxation.  The clearest example is a turnover tax, which is 
levied on all sales rather than on value-added or just final sales.”). 
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with a merger than a contract might be sufficient to induce the merger 
outcome.  But asked to provide evidence that the parties could not engage 
in the same conduct via contract, the parties would be unable to do so.  The 
consequence, then, would be the loss of potential gains from closer 
integration. 
At the same time, the cavalier assumption that parties would be able—
legally—to enter into an analogous contract in lieu of a merger is 
problematic, given that it would likely be precisely the form of contract 
(foreclosing downstream or upstream access) that is alleged to create 
problems with the merger in the first place.47  Indeed, legal risk is one of 
the reasons why a merger might be preferable to a contract, and because 
the relevant markets here are oligopoly markets, the possibility of 
impermissible vertical restraints between large firms with significant 
market share is quite real. 
More importantly, the assumptions underlying the contention that 
contracts and mergers are functionally equivalent legal devices simply 
ignores the real world.  Consider that one reason some takeovers are 
hostile is because incumbent managers do not want to merge, and often 
believe that they are running a company as well as it can be run—that a 
change of corporate control would not improve efficiency.  The same 
presumptions may also underlie refusals to contract and, even more likely, 
may explain why, to the other firm, a contract would be ineffective. 
But, while there is no way to contract without bilateral agreement, 
there is a corporate control mechanism to force a transaction.48  In this 
institutional environment, a merger may be easier to realize than a 
contract.  In this case, again, the assumption that contract should be the 
relevant baseline and the preferred mechanism for coordination is 
misplaced—even if other firms in the industry are successfully 
accomplishing the same thing via contract. 
Finally, the fixation on the equivalency of the form of vertical 
integration (i.e., merger versus contract) is likely to lead enforcers to focus 
on static price and cost effects, and miss the dynamic organizational and 
informational effects that lead to unexpected, increased innovation across 
and within firms.  As Harold Demsetz put it, “[i]t is a mistake to confuse 
the firm of economic theory with its real-world namesake.  The chief 
 
 47. See FTC Hearing #5 Transcript, supra note 21, at 73 (statement of Francine Lafontaine, 
Professor, Michigan-Ross) (“I want to reemphasize that there are also rules against vertical restraints 
in antitrust laws, and so to say that the firms could achieve the mergers outcome by using vertical 
restraints is kind of putting them in a circular motion where we are telling them you cannot merge 
because you could do it by contract, and then we say, but these contract terms are not acceptable.”). 
 48. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 117–
18 (1965). 
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mission of neoclassical economics is to understand how the price system 
coordinates the use of resources, not to understand the inner workings of 
real firms.”49  In the hands of Oliver Williamson (and the enterprise of 
Transaction Cost Economics, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize), 
this means that understanding firms in the real world (notably for purposes 
of antitrust policy and enforcement) entails taking an organization theory 
approach, in contrast to the “orthodox” economic perspective: 
The lens of contract approach to the study of economic organization is 
partly complementary but also partly rival to the orthodox [neoclassical 
economic] lens of choice.  Specifically, whereas the latter focuses on 
simple market exchange, the lens of contract is predominantly concerned 
with the complex contracts.  Among the major differences is that non‐
standard and unfamiliar contractual practices and organizational 
structures that orthodoxy interprets as manifestations of monopoly are 
often perceived to serve economizing purposes under the lens of 
contract.  A major reason for these and other differences is that 
orthodoxy is dismissive of organization theory whereas organization 
theory provides conceptual foundations for the lens of contract.50 
Properly understood, and as we discuss in subsequent parts, the choice 
of whether to contract or merge derives from a host of complicated factors, 
made all the more complicated in the case of some R&D-intensive, high-
tech firms because they deliver by the fact that there is an incredible degree 
of flexibility in the products and business models they deliver.51  Simplistic 
static analyses are too rigid for the purpose of analyzing firms that, on the 
surface, appear to be in separate markets, but that actually generate entire 
ecosystems locked in head-to-head competition with each other.  This 
competition often manifests not in price, but in both technological and 
business model (organizational) innovation.52 
Thus, there can be no legally relevant inference drawn against a 
company when it chooses one method of vertical integration over another 
in the general case, and even less so in the case of firms in highly dynamic 
industries.  Despite assertions to the contrary, the economics literature 
continues to support the idea that vertical mergers are generally 
procompetitive and there is no need to disrupt the current approach to 
enforcement in the context of vertical mergers. 
 
 49. Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. ECON. 375, 
377 (1983). 
 50. Oliver E. Williamson, Examining Economic Organization Through the Lens of Contract, 12 
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 917, 917 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 51. See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal 
Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 
ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 591–92 (1993). 
 52. See generally infra Part V. 
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL MERGERS 
Although it is inarguably true that economic learning regarding 
vertical integration has significantly progressed since the adoption of the 
1984 guidelines, there is no reason to believe that the nature of vertical 
integration needs to be completely reconceptualized.  As we discuss 
below, the established presumption in favor of permitting vertical 
integration through merger remains sound policy. 
Vertical integration can clearly generate efficiencies.53  After all, the 
elimination of double marginalization (EDM) is, in a sense, just a proxy 
for all of the benefits that arise from a more efficient supply chain.54  In a 
statement during the 2018 FTC hearings, FTC Commissioner Christine 
Wilson echoed this point with respect to vertical mergers: 
[I]n contrast to horizontal guidelines, the economics in vertical mergers 
indicate efficiencies are much more likely.  Professor Shapiro went so 
far as to call them “inherently” likely at our hearing.  Given this dynamic, 
it may be appropriate to presume that certain vertical efficiencies are 
verifiable and substantial in the absence of strong evidence to the 
contrary, even if we would not do so in a horizontal merger case.55 
By contrast, the core of the arguments presented above against vertical 
mergers—as exemplified in Professor Salop’s work—is rooted in a belief 
that mergers and contracts are usually equally capable of realizing the 
positive results from vertical integration, and therefore, the choice to 
merge—absent affirmative demonstration that contracting is not viable—
must instead be presumed to be based on anticompetitive ends.56  This 
misconception does not do justice to the rich literature that studies the 
make-or-buy decisions that firms face. 
A. The Underlying “Make-or-Buy” Decision 
The extent of vertical integration is often characterized as the “make-
or-buy decision.”57  As Ronald Coase identified in 1937, transaction costs 
determine the boundary between what is produced within the firm and 
 
 53. Wilson, supra note 19, at 4 (“[W]e know that integrating operations at different levels of 
production often yields clear economic benefits.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 9.  
 56. FTC Hearing #5 Presentation Slides, supra note 10, at 24-26. 
 57. See Oliver E. Williamson, Nobel Prize Lecture, Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural 
Progression 471 (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/williamson_lecture.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NA3J-Z8W3]. 
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what is purchased from the market.58  When the cost of contracting across 
firms becomes too high, it may make sense to merge into a firm (or to 
restructure an existing one) in order to organize internally.59  “[T]he firm 
is the inclusive set of transactions for which the decision is to make rather 
than buy.”60 
Of course, “make-or-buy” is shorthand for a much broader concept.  
In addition to the decision whether to produce an input in-house or buy the 
input in the market, firms face a broad spectrum of analogous choices.  
Firms must choose whether to hire labor as employees or independent 
contractors.  In real estate, they choose whether to own or rent property.  
For intellectual property, they choose whether to invent or license.  For 
retail sales, firms are faced with a wide-range of options: company stores, 
franchise, license, wholesale sales, direct-to-retail, or direct-to-consumer.  
It is because of this range of decisions that Coase describes vertical 
integration as a spectrum along which the firm chooses the extent to which 
the “complicated market structure with exchange transactions is 
substituted [by] the entrepreneur co-ordinator, who directs production.”61 
In the first pages of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith describes the 
“trifling manufacture” of pins, an example that highlights the diversity and 
complexity of operations over which the decision to vertically integrate 
must be made.62 
[A] workman not educated to this business . . . could scarce, perhaps, 
with his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not 
make twenty.  But in the way in which this business is now carried on, 
not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number 
of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades.  One 
man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points 
it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving, the head; to make the head 
requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar 
business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put 
them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in 
this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in 
some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in 
others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them.  I 
have seen a small manufactory of this kind, where ten men only were 
employed . . . .  Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them 
 
 58. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-95 (1937). 
 59. Id. at 390 (“The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that 
there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”). 
 60. See Williamson, supra note 57, at 471. 
 61. Coase, supra note 58, at 388.  
 62. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 3 
(Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., William Benton 1952) (1776). 
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upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day.63 
Smith’s review of the pin factory is often used to describe how the 
division of labor can increase productivity.  However, without directly 
saying so, Smith is describing vertical integration.  First, he contrasts a 
vertically integrated sole proprietor (“a workman not educated to this 
business”) with a 10-employee factory.64  He notes that some factories 
divide labor into one-person/one-task and others have some employees 
doing several tasks.65  Thus, even among factories producing the same 
good, there are various degrees of vertical integration within each factory.  
However, Smith does not investigate why such variation would occur.66  
Indeed, Smith leaves many questions unanswered.  If putting the pins in 
paper is “a trade by itself,” why does the firm have an employee do it 
instead of contracting with a putting-pins-in-paper firm?  The first man in 
the factory draws out the wire, which came from a metal ingot.  Where did 
the metal ingot come from and why doesn’t the factory also make the 
ingot? 
Coase attempts to answer these questions.  He notes that market 
transactions are costly.67  Smith’s pin factory has “eighteen distinct 
operations.”68  If each of these operations were performed by separate 
firms, the pin seller would have to discover the appropriate price to pay 
for each input and the contribution of that input to the seller’s profits.  Is 
placing the head on the pin more or less valuable than putting the pins in 
paper?  An integrated firm does not have to ask that question.  Also, the 
pin seller would have to negotiate, monitor, and enforce contracts with as 
many as eighteen different suppliers.  If each operation is critical to the 
production of a pin, then each supplier can hold out for more favorable 
terms of trade.  An integrated firm does not have such worries and does 
not face these costs.  Coase’s entrepreneur directs employees to perform 
each task and can arrange tasks among employees that maximize the 
entrepreneur’s profit.69  It is for this reason that some have characterized 
the firm as an organization run by command and control in contrast to a 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Coase, supra note 58, at 390 (“The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would 
seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”). 
 68. SMITH, supra note 62, at 3. 
 69. Coase, supra note 58, at 388 (“Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in 
place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-
co-ordinator, who directs production.”). 
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market governed by voluntary exchange.70 
Coase also observes the limits to vertical integration.  In particular, 
there may be limits to his entrepreneur’s resources or abilities, such that 
adding an additional transaction within the firm would generate decreasing 
returns.71  “Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of 
organizing an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs 
involved in carrying out the transaction in the open market, or, to the costs 
of organizing by another entrepreneur.”72 
In this way, Coase addresses the question of where the pin factory’s 
metal ingot came from.  If the factory bought the ingot from a 
metalworker, then the costs of making the ingot in house were greater than 
costs associated with negotiating a supply agreement with a metalworker.  
On the other hand, if the factory made the ingot, then the costs of 
production were lower than costs of a market transaction.  For example, 
by the 18th century, metalworking and wiredrawing were somewhat 
mechanized and a metalworker might have vertically integrated into 
wiredrawing and then into the manufacture of pins.73 
Coase notes that when one firm vertically integrates with another, the 
firm may acquire its partner’s entire business and not just a single 
operation: “If A therefore wishes to avoid a market transaction, he will 
have to take over all the processes of production controlled by B.”74  For 
example, a wire maker who buys a metalworking firm would also acquire 
the metalworker’s business that makes metal sheet and plate.  But the costs 
of managing these additional lines of business could exceed the benefits 
of vertically integrating the ingot/wiredrawing process.  Coase’s analysis 
of the “make-or-buy” decision can be summarized as choice between 
balancing the costs of using the price mechanism and the costs of 
contracting against the cost of internal organization.75 
  
 
 70. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972) (“It is common to see the firm 
characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to 
that available in the conventional market.  This is delusion.”). 
 71. Coase, supra note 58, at 394. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Brian D. Newbury & Michael R. Notis, The History and Evolution of Wiredrawing 
Techniques, 56 JOM 33, 37 (2004). 
 74. Coase, supra note 58, at 395. 
 75. Id. at 394-95.  
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B. The Complexities That Undermine the Functional Equivalence of 
Contract and Merger 
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz extend Coase’s ideas.76  First, 
however, they dispense with the notion that a firm is characterized as an 
organization ruled by the diktat of the owner-manager as “delusion.”77  
They note that many firms do not own their inputs—especially labor—and 
cannot move them around like chess pieces.78 
Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that document 
is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that 
brand of bread.  I have no contract to continue to purchase from the 
grocer and neither the employer nor the employee is bound by any 
contractual obligations to continue their relationship.  Long-term 
contracts between employer and employee are not the essence of the 
organization we call a firm.79   
Coase’s approach focused on differences in transaction costs to 
explain whether a firm relied on the price system or intra-firm decision 
making.80 
Alchian and Demsetz conclude that firms have a fundamentally 
different production function from separate, additive market-based 
production—and that cooperative team-based production could be much 
more efficient.81  Smith notes that if the ten employees in the pin factory 
“wrought separately and independently,” fewer than 200 pins would be 
produced in a day, but organized as a team they produced more than 
48,000 pins a day.82 
George Stigler observes some activities are subject to increasing 
returns to scale and asks why the firm does not therefore exploit those 
returns to become a monopoly.83  He answers that some activities are 
subject to decreasing returns to scale and the opposing forces of increasing 
and decreasing returns limits the size of the firm.84  In Stigler’s model, 
often called the industry life cycle, firms in an industry begin with vertical 
integration as the market may be too small to support specialized firms 
 
 76. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 70, at 783-84.  
 77. Id. at 777. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Coase, supra note 58, at 396-98. 
 81. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 70, at 779. 
 82. SMITH, supra note 62, at 3.  
 83. George Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 
185, 187–88 (1951). 
 84. Id. at 188.  
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producing an intermediate input.85  Over time, both the industry and firms 
grow.86  At some point, as the markets for intermediate goods mature, 
specialized firms emerge and the vertically integrated firm spins off or 
outsources some processes.87  As an industry declines, shrinking markets 
for intermediate goods may cause the remaining firms to re-integrate these 
processes.88  Thus, in Stigler’s model, the degree of vertical integration is 
a dynamic interaction among the firm’s economies of scale as well as the 
extent of the firm’s market and the market for its inputs.89 
Importantly, Alchian and Demsetz conclude that one of the key 
diseconomies of scale comes from the transaction costs associated with 
gathering and using information.90  Most of these information costs 
involve monitoring, measuring, and rewarding the performance of 
cooperating resources, which they describe as metering resources: 
[S]ince costs must be incurred to monitor each other, each input owner 
will have more incentive to shirk when he works as part of a team, than 
if his performance could be monitored easily or if he did not work as a 
team.  If there is a net increase in productivity available by team 
production, net of the metering cost associated with disciplining the 
team, then team production will be relied upon rather than a multitude of 
bilateral exchange of separable individual outputs.91 
The costs of metering are complicated by the jointness of production.  
Alchian and Demsetz provide the hypothetical of two workers jointly 
lifting heavy cargo into trucks.92  The manager cannot determine each 
worker’s contribution to the task simply by looking at the total weight 
loaded in a day: because it is a team effort, by definition it is not the sum 
of the separable outputs of each worker.93 
Alchian and Demsetz develop a model of the organization of a firm 
from these two foundations: (1) team production as an essential condition 
for a firm and (2) costly metering of the team and other resources.94  
Managers emerge from a need to meter teams and other resources, with 
managers’ incentives to be productive and effective driven by sharing the 
 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 190.  
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 91. Id. at 780.  
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942 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
residual income associated with their teams.95  The various degrees of 
vertical integration across organizations thus reflect variations in the 
efficiency of team production, variations in the extent and cost of market 
alternatives, and variations in the costs of metering.96 
Oliver Williamson largely agrees with Alchian and Demsetz’s 
assessment of team production.97  However, he argues that separable 
production processes are widespread and  “intermediate product market 
transactions are much more numerous than conventional wisdom would 
suggest.”98  Thus, he concludes that metering team production may be an 
important function performed by a firm, but is not an essential condition 
for the firm.99  Instead, he argues that the extent of asset specificity is key 
to a firm’s make-or-buy decision.100 
For Williamson, asset specificity includes durable specialized 
investments or general assets that are very costly to relocate or redeploy.101  
As asset specificity increases, the cost of contracting—and the costs 
associated with incomplete contracts—increases.102  He concludes that 
greater asset specificity would be associated with greater integration 
within a firm. Indeed, transaction costs arising from asset specificity are a 
common source of the decision to vertically integrate.103  Williamson’s 
model also hypothesizes that, because of economies of scale, larger firms 
will be more integrated into the production of inputs than will smaller 
firms, which is consistent with Stigler’s industry life cycle model.104 
Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Alchian provide empirical 
evidence for the importance of asset specificity in vertical integration.105  
They conclude that incomplete contracting and asset specificity can make 
vertical integration more efficient than competitive contracting.106  
 
 95. Id. at 782–83. 
 96. See id. at 795. 
 97. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 
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 98. Id. at 87. 
 99. Id. at 88 n.44. 
 100. Id. at 89. 
 101. Id. at 95-96. 
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 103. See Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 543, 563 (2010) (“Contractual 
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 104. Id. at 561-62. 
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Contracting Process, 21 J.L. ECON. 297, 298 (1978).  
 106. Id. at 306-07. 
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Contracts are incomplete because of the costs of negotiating, monitoring, 
and enforcing contractual terms in the face of uncertainty.107  This can lead 
to opportunistic behavior and the appropriation of quasi-rents from the 
specific asset.108  This risk of appropriation of quasi-rents can be 
inefficient if it means that value-increasing investments are not made, or 
if a less efficient investment is made to protect against appropriation or 
opportunistic behavior.109 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian provide evidence from General Motor’s 
relationship with Fisher Body in the 1920s.110  In 1919, GM entered into a 
ten-year contractual agreement with Fisher in which GM would purchase 
nearly all of its closed automobile bodies from Fisher.111  As auto body 
manufacture shifted from wood to metal, Fisher required assets specialized 
for GM’s design.112  During the term of the agreement, demand for GM’s 
autos increased by more than projected by the parties at the time of the 
agreement.113  GM became dissatisfied with the pricing terms of the 
agreement in the face of increased demand.114  In particular, Fisher could 
act opportunistically by demanding higher prices than those articulated in 
the contract: GM could not obtain auto bodies from other sources on short 
notice, and halting assembly was extremely costly.115  In addition, GM 
pressed Fisher to locate its body plants adjacent to GM’s assembly plants 
to reduce transportation and inventory costs.116  Fisher, however, 
resisted.117  In 1924, GM began buying Fisher stock and completed a 
merger with Fisher in 1926.118 
As Klein, Crawford, and Alchian conclude: 
[A]s we move toward more complex ownership relationships the 
problem of efficiently structuring the economic relationship, either 
within the firm or via contracts, also becomes highly complex.  Stating 
that the world is complicated is another way of admitting our ignorance.  
However, explicitly recognizing that contracting costs are not zero, as 
they are often implicitly assumed to be in economic analysis, and 
explicitly considering the determinants of these costs (such as the 
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presence of appropriable quasi rents) is the first step in explaining the 
large variety of contractual and ownership arrangements we observe in 
the real world.119 
While many functions can be performed either by contract across 
firms or by a single, integrated firm internally, the complex reality is that 
the two are not always functionally interchangeable, nor do they always 
impose the same risks and costs or allocate them the same way. 
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL (AND IMPORTANT) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL MERGERS 
The organizational and contractual complexities that underlie the 
choice between merger and contract are fundamental to understanding the 
conduct of firms and the likely competitive effects of their behavior.  As 
we discuss above,120 the assumption by some critics that contract and 
merger are functional equivalents is at odds with the fundamental 
economics of vertical relationships.  But that same complexity also 
undermines the assumption that horizontal and vertical mergers impose 
competitive threats by the same mechanism—and with a similar level of 
risk—and should therefore be given similar enforcement attention, both in 
kind and in intensity. 
Recent former FTC Bureau of Competition Director, Bruce Hoffman, 
lays out the extensive and fundamental differences between horizontal and 
vertical mergers in a compelling 2018 talk.121  Of particular importance: 
 Horizontal mergers combine competitors.  By definition, a merger of 
competitors directly and necessarily reduces competition by eliminating 
a substitute.  There is a strong theoretical basis for horizontal 
enforcement because economic models predict at least nominal potential 
for anticompetitive effects due to elimination of horizontal competition 
between substitutes. 
 In contrast, vertical mergers do not combine substitutes, and in fact 
often involve complements, such as a product plus distribution or a 
critical input to a complex device.  Where horizontal mergers reduce 
competition on their face—though that reduction could be minimal or 
more than offset by benefits—vertical mergers do not.  Instead, to 
determine whether a vertical merger threatens competitive harm 
requires predictions about the post-merger conduct of the merged firm 
where theoretical predictions are ambiguous.  As Professor Steve Salop 
has catalogued, and as I discuss in more detail in a few minutes, there 
 
 119. Id. at 325. 
 120. See supra Part II. 
 121. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 2–3.  
2020] THE FATAL ECONOMIC FLAWS 945 
are plenty of theories of anticompetitive harm from vertical mergers.  But 
the problem is that those theories don’t generally predict harm from 
vertical mergers; they simply show that harm is possible under certain 
conditions. 
 Moreover, while efficiencies are often important in horizontal 
mergers, they are much more intrinsic to a vertical transaction due to 
the cost-reducing effects of most vertical mergers, at least in the abstract.  
Due to the elimination of double-marginalization and the resulting 
downward pressure on prices, vertical mergers come with a more built-
in likelihood of improving competition than horizontal mergers. 
. . . . 
 Unfortunately, compared to horizontal mergers, there are also fewer 
quantitative theoretical models that we can use to attempt to predict 
outcomes in vertical scenarios, and the models that exist have a far 
shorter track record than those used in assessing horizontal mergers. . . 
.122 
A. Indirect Competitors Are Different Than Actual Competitors 
Salop and other critics of the current state of vertical merger 
enforcement, on the other hand, assert that because the eventual effect of 
a vertical merger is a “horizontal” one, the two types of mergers should be 
treated in essence the same way.123  According to Salop, “For the type of 
markets that are normally analyzed in antitrust, the competitive harms from 
vertical mergers are just as intrinsic as are harms from horizontal 
mergers.”124  Thus, a vertically integrated firm faces an “intrinsic 
incentive”125 to foreclose downstream competition “by raising the input 
price it charges to the rivals of its downstream merger partner” in the same 
way that horizontal firms face an “inherent upward pricing pressure from 
horizontal mergers in differentiated products markets, even without 
coordination.”126 
But an “intrinsic harm” and an “intrinsic incentive” are not the same 
thing.  In particular, an “intrinsic incentive” to foreclose competition in the 
vertical context still requires a decision—and the ability—to execute upon 
the incentive in a contractual relationship with non-integrated downstream 
firms.  By contrast, the pressure faced by horizontal competitors requires 
no coordination and is imposed by consumers rather than through directed 
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conduct by a competitor. In the limit case, the horizontal competitor that 
does not respond to pricing pressure from a competitor (even a 
differentiated one) will go out of business; the vertical firm that does not 
raise input prices to differentiated downstream rivals will not face this 
same existential threat. 
In an implicit acknowledgement of this distinction, Salop actually 
describes the competition between an upstream firm and a downstream 
partner as indirect: “the upstream merging firm that supplies a downstream 
firm is inherently an ‘indirect competitor’ of the future downstream 
merging firm.  That indirect competition is eliminated by merger.  This 
unilateral effect is exactly parallel to the unilateral effect from a horizontal 
merger.”127  But of course, the two are not “exactly parallel.” 
To the extent that removal of a vertical indirect (or potential) 
competitor is deemed analogous to horizontal competition, any analysis of 
that situation would have to account for the difference in effect between 
removing an existing, direct competitor and an indirect or potential one.  
Indirect competition is not the same as direct competition.  Even in Salop’s 
telling, the mechanism by which it operates requires that the firm have 
market power and that, post-merger, the firm raises costs to the 
downstream firm’s horizontal rivals.  While this is possible, of course, it 
is not guaranteed, and, at the very least, would have to be conditioned by 
the likelihood of it occurring.  A horizontal competitor, on the other hand, 
operates as an immediate and present constraint, the effect of the removal 
of which is not conditioned on further action by the merged firm. The size 
of the effect may be (and often is) small.  But the effect is automatic. 
Furthermore, it is not actually the case that the incentive to foreclose 
downstream rivals is “intrinsic,” nor is it the case that the effect is 
deleterious: 
However, there is no general incentive to raise rivals’ costs, and even 
when it is privately profitable to do so, the attendant welfare 
consequences may be positive.  If the cost raising strategy is profitable, 
it may lead to an increase or decrease in price.  This is because the 
dominant firm may expand output enough to offset the contraction in the 
output of the fringe.  If the strategy leads to an increase in price, total 
welfare still may rise if the dominant firm is more efficient than the 
fringe firms, as the shift in output from the fringe to the dominant firm 
can increase productive efficiency.128 
It is true that, to the extent that a pre-merger upstream firm could 
merge with a rival instead of the target firm, or could facilitate entry by a 
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new downstream rival, it can operate as a constraint on the merging firm.  
And, indeed, potential competitors are important constraints on existing 
market actors.  But by definition, they do not offer the same degree of 
constraint as existing, actual competitors.  Rather, any analysis of their 
competitive effect would have to incorporate the probability of entry.  
Moreover, such analysis would have to differentiate between entry that is 
deterred because of increased competition and anticompetitive 
foreclosure: 
 Many models of vertical practices find that competitors are excluded 
precisely because the practices in question intensify competition.  
Antitrust policymakers tempted to draw policy inferences from these 
analyses always must bear in mind that harm to competitors . . . is not 
the same as harm to competition.  Instead, harm to competitors is often—
indeed, usually—consistent with enhanced competition.129 
High-quality analysis of the effects of potential competition are few 
and far between.  But, according to several studies, a potential competitor 
may have on the order of one-quarter percent to two percent the effect on 
competition as an actual competitor.130 
Furthermore, any efficiency gains from a horizontal merger are not 
automatic and must be established.  On the other hand, the realization of 
vertical merger efficiencies resulting from the elimination of double 
marginalization at least is automatic: 
Some horizontal mergers do not create efficiencies; they are profitable 
only because of the post-merger anticompetitive conduct made possible 
by the transaction.   
 By contrast, the primary lesson of both the older literature on vertical 
integration, as well as the newer “post-Chicago” literature, is that this 
trade-off invariably exists for all vertical transactions that threaten to 
reduce consumer welfare.131 
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The logic is simple: Potentially welfare-reducing vertical mergers are 
those that involve an upstream firm with market power.  Thus, pre-merger, 
all downstream firms bear presumptively higher input costs, and, in order 
to realize their own profit, must increase final product prices to consumers 
by even more.132  But after the merger, the merged downstream entity no 
longer pays the markup.  As a result, it “enjoys lower input costs and thus 
increases its output, thereby increasing welfare.”133  At the same time, of 
course, non-merged downstream firms bear a higher input price, and it is 
an empirical question whether the net consumer welfare effect is positive 
or negative.134  But it is never a question that the two effects operate 
simultaneously and that the reduction of double marginalization 
necessarily occurs.  Indeed, it is most likely to arise and to lead to net 
consumer welfare benefits precisely where there is the greatest potential 
for anticompetitive price increases to downstream rivals: 
High price-cost margins increase the size of the efficiency gain to the 
integrated firm as well as the potential for anticompetitive input price 
increases. . . .  [And] the post-Chicago literature suggests that vertical 
mergers that occur in the presence of high premerger concentration are 
likely to result in lower prices to consumers.135 
All else equal, the effect of removing a horizontal competitor by 
merger is automatic: less competition.  That is not necessarily bad; it may 
be compensated for and it may also enable innovation, more competition, 
or other results that benefit consumers.  But, in the first instance, former 
head-to-head competitors that merge are no longer competing.  With 
vertical mergers, however, the effect is not to automatically reduce 
competition (indirect, potential, or otherwise).  A vertically integrated firm 
might choose to hurt unaffiliated downstream competitors by more than it 
benefits its integrated downstream firm, but nothing is automatic.  
Assessing the competitive effect of such a merger necessarily means 
incorporating an added layer of uncertainty, complexity, and distance 
between cause and effect.  And, in the absence of a few particular, tenuous, 
and stylized circumstances, “[i]n this model, vertical integration is 
unambiguously good for consumers.”136 
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In response, proponents of invigorated vertical merger enforcement 
argue in part that: 
[T]he claim that vertical mergers are inherently unlikely to raise 
horizontal concerns fails to recognize that all theories of harm from 
vertical mergers posit a horizontal interaction that is the ultimate source 
of harm.  Vertical mergers create an inherent exclusionary incentive as 
well as the potential for coordinated effects similar to those that occur in 
horizontal mergers.137 
But this fails to resolve anything, and the “analogy with horizontal 
mergers is misleading.”138  It is uncontroversial (and far from 
“[un]recognized”) that “all theories of harm from vertical mergers posit a 
horizontal interaction that is the ultimate source of harm.”139  All this says 
is that there could be harm of the sort horizontal mergers might cause.  But 
it does not acknowledge that the likelihood and extent of that harm are 
different in the vertical and horizontal contexts.  Moreover, it does not note 
that the mechanism by which harm might arise is different and more 
complex in the vertical case.  All in all, the probability of that outcome is 
lower in the case of a vertical merger where it is dependent on an additional 
step that may or may not arrive and that may or may not cause harm. 
B. Empirical Evidence Continues to Support the Presumption That 
Vertical Mergers Are Procompetitive or Competitively Benign 
Critics of the “Chicago school orthodoxy” on vertical mergers pay 
special attention to “oligopoly” markets,140 contending that “[a] stronger 
overarching procompetitive presumption for vertical mergers does not 
make sense in oligopoly markets where vertical merger enforcement 
would be focused.”141  But, based on the empirical evidence, the critics are 
simply wrong that the evidence supports greater condemnation of vertical 
mergers, even in oligopoly markets.  At best, the evidence from oligopoly 
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markets is mixed.  This suggests, not a rush to condemnation, but instead 
a need for further research.  Particularly, before any new policies are based 
on such ambivalent (at best) evidence. 
These criticisms either must ignore or dismiss the hundreds of 
econometric studies famously reviewed by Lafontaine and Slade.142  
Indeed, typically this longstanding work is criticized as irrelevant or 
insufficient.143  But the reality is that these studies still constitute the 
overwhelming majority of the evidence we have; and many, if not most, 
of the studies are perfectly well done, even by modern standards.144  The 
upshot of these studies, as Lafontaine and Slade put it, is that, “consistent 
with the large set of efficiency motives for vertical mergers that we have 
described so far, the evidence on the consequences of vertical mergers 
suggests that consumers mostly benefit from mergers that firms undertake 
voluntarily.”145 
Lafontaine, while acknowledging the limitations of some of the 
evidence used for these studies, recently reiterated the relevance of the 
studies to vertical mergers and restated the overall conclusions of the 
literature: 
 We were clear that some of the early empirical evidence is less than 
ideal, in terms of data and methods. 
 But we summarized by saying that the empirical literature reveals 
consistent evidence of efficiencies associated with the use of vertical 
restraints (when chosen by market participants) and, similarly, with 
vertical integration decisions.146 
Slade also reiterated this same conclusion in June 2019 at the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, where she 
noted that, even in light of further studies, “[t]he empirical evidence leads 
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one to conclude that most vertical mergers are efficient.”147  Moreover, 
Slade noted that forecasting likely effects from vertical mergers using 
more modern tools, like assessment of vertical upward pricing pressure, is 
a fraught and unreliable endeavor.148  Regarding the AT&T-Time Warner 
merger, in particular, Slade remarks: 
 All of my comments are especially applicable to mergers in the 
technology, media, and telecom sectors.  In particular those mergers 
usually involve many products both up and downstream, some of which 
might be susceptible to foreclosure and others which might not be.  For 
example, before the contested merger between AT&T and Time Warner, 
Time Warner owned many content providers . . . each of which provided 
many products, and AT&T distributed video programming and had 
millions of direct to consumer relationships as well as high speed 
networks.  Forecasting the effects of such a complex transaction using 
vGUPPIs and EDM alone would be subject to many type 1 and 2 errors.  
Furthermore, the US Justice Department focused on the merged firm’s 
increased bargaining leverage, and vGUPPIs do not incorporate 
bargaining between up and downstream firms.149 
In response, critics point to many newer studies, claiming these studies 
demonstrate harm from vertical mergers: “Surveys of earlier economic 
studies, relied upon by commenters who propose a procompetitive 
presumption, reference studies of vertical mergers in which the researchers 
sometimes identified competitive harm and sometimes did not. However, 
recent empirical work using the most advanced empirical toolkit often 
finds evidence of anticompetitive effects.”150 
The implication is that the balance of evidence taken from these 
studies tips the scales against a presumption of benefits from vertical 
mergers.  Yet the newer literature is no different than the old in finding 
widely procompetitive results overall, intermixed with relatively few 
seemingly harmful results.  As scholars at the Global Antitrust Institute at 
George Mason Law School have noted in a thorough canvassing of the 
more recent literature: 
 In sum, these papers from 2009-2018 continue to support the 
conclusions from Lafontaine & Slade (2007) and Cooper et al. (2005) 
that consumers mostly benefit from vertical integration. While vertical 
integration can certainly foreclose rivals in theory, there is only limited 
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empirical evidence supporting that finding in real markets.151 
Below, we briefly review the actual results of several of these recent 
studies, including, in particular, studies that were referenced at the recent 
FTC Hearings to support claims that the “econometric evidence does not 
support a stronger procompetitive presumption.”152 
1.  Luco and Marshall 
Fernando Luco and Guillermo Marshall examined Coca-Cola and 
PepsiCo acquisitions of some of their downstream bottlers.153  At the time, 
Dr Pepper Snapple Group “remained independent in selling inputs to 
bottlers.”154  Bottlers, even those that were vertically integrated with one 
of their upstream suppliers, purchased inputs from competing upstream 
suppliers.155  Based on their statistical analysis, the authors concluded that 
vertical integration in the carbonated-beverage industry was associated 
with price increases for Dr Pepper Snapple Group products and price 
decreases for both Coca-Cola and PepsiCo products bottled by vertically 
integrated bottlers.156  However, the market share of the products 
associated with higher prices was no more than two percent.  Thus, the 
authors conclude: “vertical integration did not have a significant effect on 
quantity-weighted prices when considering the full set of products . . . .”157 
It could be argued that certain members of “targeted customer” 
markets experienced harm from the vertical merger.  Salop provides an 
example of 7-Up and Dr Pepper consumers, which raises the question: 
what is the relevant market?158  For example, 7-Up is likely a close 
substitute for Sprite (Coca-Cola) and Sierra Mist (PepsiCo), and Dr Pepper 
is likely a close substitute for Pibb Xtra (formerly Mr. Pibb, a Coca-Cola 
product).  In the face of consumer substitution, it is not clear whether the 
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relevant consumers experienced any measurable harm, even in the face of 
the estimated price increases. 
The paper in fact demonstrates that vertical integration did not create 
harm in the cases studied.  The price of Coke and Pepsi went down and 
the cost to some rivals increased,159 but, overall, the effect on consumers 
was either an efficiency gain or no change. 160  As Francine Lafontaine 
noted, “in total, [Coke and Pepsi] consumers were better off given who 
was consuming how much of what.”161 
2. Hastings and Gilbert 
Justine Hastings and Richard Gilbert concluded that vertical 
integration is associated with statistically significant higher wholesale 
gasoline prices.162  Using data from 1996 to 1998, their study examined 
the wholesale prices charged by a vertically integrated refiner/retailer and 
found the firm charged higher wholesale prices in cities where its retail 
outlets competed more with independent gas stations.163  Hastings and 
Gilbert concluded that their observations are consistent with a theory of 
raising rivals’ costs.164 
In subsequent research, Christopher Taylor, Nicolas Kreisle, and Paul 
Zimmerman examined retail gasoline prices following the 1997 
acquisition of an independent gasoline retailer by a vertically integrated 
refiner/retailer.165  They estimated the merger was associated with a price 
increase of 0.4 to 1.0 cent per gallon—about one percent or less—and was 
economically insignificant.166  These results were at odds with Hastings’ 
earlier review of the same merger which concluded that the replacement 
of independent retailers with branded vertically integrated retailers would 
result in higher prices.167 
To explain the conflicting results between Hastings and Taylor et al., 
Hastings highlighted the challenges of evaluating vertical mergers with 
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incomplete data or using different sets of data—even seemingly similar 
data can yield wildly different results.168  Because of the wide range of 
reported results and their sensitivity to the data used, caution should be 
exercised before inferring any general conclusions from this line of 
research. 
Other commonly cited studies—referenced for the proposition that the 
more recent evidence on vertical mergers shows a greater likelihood of 
harm—fare no better. 
3. Crawford et al. 
Gregory Crawford, Robin Lee, Michael Whinston, and Ali Yurukoglu 
examined vertical mergers between cable multichannel video 
programming distributors (MVPDs) and regional sports networks 
(RSNs).169  Margaret Slade characterizes the findings of the paper as 
mixed because vertical integration can be associated with both beneficial 
and harmful effects.170  And, in a purely semantic sense, that is an accurate 
characterization.  But the overall results in Crawford et al. overwhelmingly 
found procompetitive consumer welfare effects: 
In counterfactual simulations that enforce program access rules, we find 
that vertical integration leads to significant gains in both consumer and 
aggregate welfare. . . .  Averaging results across channels, we find that 
integration of a single RSN with effective program access rules in place 
would reduce average cable prices by 1.2% ($0.67) per subscriber per 
month in markets served by the RSN, and increase overall carriage of the 
RSN by 9.4%. Combined, these effects would yield, on average, a $0.43 
increase in total welfare per household from all television services, 
representing approximately 17% of the average consumer willingness to 
pay for a single RSN. We also predict that consumer welfare would 
increase. 
. . . . 
 On net, we find that the overall effect of vertical integration in the 
absence of effective program access rules—allowing for both efficiency 
and foreclosure incentives—is to increase consumer and total welfare on 
average, resulting in (statistically significant) gains of approximately 
$0.38–0.39 per household per month, representing 15–16% of the 
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average consumer willingness to pay for an RSN. . . .171 
Their results are sensitive to the presence of program access rules.172  
These rules ensure that non-integrated rival distributors have access to 
content from an integrated provider.173  Crawford et al. concluded that the 
absence of enforced program access rules reduce some of the consumer 
welfare benefits.174 
Nevertheless, the implications of this well-designed and carefully 
executed study are clear.  Indeed, here is how Harvard economist, Robin 
Lee, one of the study’s authors, recently characterized the results: 
[O]ur key findings are that, on average, across channels and simulations, 
there is a net consumer welfare gain from integration.  Don’t get me 
wrong, there are significant foreclosure effects, and rival distributors are 
harmed, but these negative effects are oftentimes offset by sizeable 
efficiency gains.  Of course, this is an average.  It masks considerable 
heterogeneity.  When complete exclusion occurs, which happens both in 
our simulations and in the data some of the times, consumer welfare is 
actually harmed.175 
Two things are particularly notable about the findings of this paper.  
First, the paper properly offers the caveat—notably missing from Salop’s 
and others’ overly-confident assertions regarding vertical merger welfare 
effects—that its results do not include possible dynamic effects.176  In 
particular, the authors note that their model cannot account for investment 
decisions made by MVPDs or RSNs in the face of increased vertical 
integration.177 
Any conclusion regarding the consumer welfare effects from vertical 
integration is unreliable as a policy guide if it does not consider, for 
example, the corresponding investment effects arising from the new 
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corporate structure.  Oftentimes, this is precisely why such transactions 
take place: not (solely) to avoid double marginalization and thus to offer 
outputs at lower prices, but to better coordinate R&D at different levels of 
production in order to improve the return on (and increase the level of) 
investments (for example). 
Second, although the results hold overall, it is clear that the presence 
of statutory program access rules affects the magnitude of the positive 
effects from integration.  This highlights the importance of evaluating the 
broad institutional environment for assessing competitive effects and the 
difficulty of drafting broadly applicable guidelines.  Every situation is 
different (not only because of differing legal environments, of course); the 
reasons and justifications for, and implementations of, vertical integration 
are complex and widely divergent.  In short, the vast heterogeneity of 
circumstances, even within a single industry, ensures that predicting the 
welfare effects of a merger based on possibility theorems is a fool’s errand. 
4. Suzuki 
Ayako Suzuki reviewed the vertical merger between Time Warner and 
Turner Broadcasting in order to analyze programming and distribution in 
the cable television market.178  The paper examined the merger’s effects 
on foreclosure, per-channel prices, basic bundle product mix, and basic 
bundle penetration.179  The authors found foreclosure following the merger 
in Time Warner markets for those rival channels that were not integrated 
with any cable distributors.180  After the merger, two independent 
channels, the Disney Channel and the Fox News Channel, were foreclosed 
from Time Warner markets.181  They  note that prior to the merger, two 
Turner channels (TBS and TCM) were foreclosed by Time Warner, but 
the foreclosure was ended after the merger: “Turner suffered from the low 
market shares of TBS and TCM in Time Warner markets, therefore it 
integrated itself with Time Warner in order to recover their market 
shares.”182 
Suzuki concluded that per-channel prices decreased more in Time 
Warner markets than they would have in the absence of the merger.183  The 
paper suggests transaction cost efficiencies lowered the implicit cost to the 
 
 178. Ayako Suzuki, Market Foreclosure and Vertical Merger: A Case Study of the Vertical 
Merger Between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner, 27 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 532, 532 (2009). 
 179. Id. at 532–33. 
 180. Id. at 532. 
 181. Id. at 541. 
 182. Id. at 542. 
 183. Id. 
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distributor of the channels, causing input prices to shift downward, 
resulting in reduced cable price to consumers.184 
Crawford et al. described the limitations of Suzuki’s approach, noting 
that the studies cannot “separate efficiency from foreclosure incentives” 
and, more importantly, they cannot “provide estimates of overall welfare 
effects.”185  Crawford et al. also noted that “reduced carriage of rival non-
integrated channels could reflect either foreclosure effects or the impact of 
efficient increases in carriage of integrated channels when channels are 
substitutes.”186  What we do know is that, as an empirical matter, the clear 
weight of the evidence supports an overall presumption that such mergers 
are generally beneficial for consumers. 
C. The AT&T/Time Warner Merger Enforcement Does Not Support the 
Adoption of Heightened Burdens on Vertical Mergers 
At the FTC Hearings, Salop pointed to the DOJ’s case in its challenge 
of the AT&T/Time Warner merger187—then pending before the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has since upheld the district court’s ruling 
in favor of the merging parties.188  The Court of Appeals even upheld 
District Court Judge Leon’s overall approach to the case (despite his 
finding in favor of the merging parties), as a model for how vertical 
mergers should be assessed—claiming, in particular, that the approach 
was the same as that generally applied in the horizontal context.189 
There is, in fact, no objection to the claim that evaluation of vertical 
mergers should follow a familiar rule of reason approach.  But this does 
not mean that the application of presumptions or the extent and quality of 
sufficient evidence should be identical in every case.  The rule of reason 
is perfectly consistent with the adoption of presumptions of legality where 
we know with confidence that the asserted theories of harm are unlikely 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Crawford et al., supra note 169, at 894. 
 186. Id. 
 187. FTC Hearing #5 Presentation Slides, supra note 10, at 32. 
 188. United States v. AT&T, Inc. (AT&T-Time Warner), 916 F.3d 1029, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
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come out that way in AT&T-Time Warner.”). 
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to pan out—this is just the inverse of the adoption of the per se standard.190 
With respect to a desire that vertical mergers be evaluated under the 
standard rule of reason, there is no need to change the non-horizontal 
merger guidelines.191  In their current form, they do not apply a 
presumption that the identified potential harms from vertical mergers are 
any less problematic than those arising from horizontal mergers.  Neither 
do they recommend adoption of a more lax or different procedure for 
vertical merger analysis.192  Notably, while the recent proposed draft Joint 
Vertical Merger Guidelines—which would update the 1984 Guidelines—
state explicitly that “[t]he principles and analytical frameworks used to 
assess horizontal mergers apply to vertical mergers,”193 the 1984 
Guidelines also make repeated reference to the applicability of analytical 
standards from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.194 
Nevertheless, the notion that AT&T/Time Warner shows the 
government pursuing a rule of reason case in the vertical merger context—
exactly as it would in a horizontal context—is manifestly incorrect.  In 
fact, any changes to the guidelines based on the DOJ’s case and the court’s 
process in AT&T/Time Warner would actually move them away from 
where Salop (and others) want them to go. 
To begin with, the government conceded efficiencies in the case from 
the outset, rather than relying on the defendants to produce evidence of 
countervailing efficiencies following the government’s prima facie case as 
in a typical horizontal merger challenge.195  In effect, the government 
began with the presumption that the merger was procompetitive; and then 
offered what amounts to its own rebuttal that the inefficiencies outweighed 
the presumed efficiencies in making its initial case: effectively, that is, an  
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inefficiencies argument.  As the court put it: 
To sum up, the Court accepts that vertical mergers “are not invariably 
innocuous,” but instead can generate competitive harm “[i]n certain 
circumstances.”  The case at hand therefore turns on whether, 
notwithstanding the proposed merger’s conceded procompetitive effects, 
the Government has met its burden of proof of establishing, through 
“case-specific evidence,” that the merger of AT&T and Time Warner, at 
this time and in this remarkably dynamic industry, is likely to 
substantially lessen competition in the manner it predicts. Unfortunately 
for the Government, . . . it did not meet its burden.196 
The D.C. Circuit, in reviewing the district court decision, both 
recognized the district court’s acceptance of presumed efficiencies and 
ruled specifically that this was not an error: 
[T]he district court viewed the outcome of the litigation to “turn[] on 
whether, notwithstanding the proposed merger’s conceded 
procompetitive effects, the Government has met its burden of 
establishing, through ‘case-specific evidence,’ that the merger of AT&T 
and Time Warner, at this time and in this remarkably dynamic industry, 
is likely to substantially lessen competition in the manner it predicts.” 
 Several amici urge this court to speak definitively on the proper legal 
standard for evaluating vertical mergers . . . .  But there is no need to 
opine on the proper legal standards for evaluating vertical mergers 
because, on appeal, neither party challenges the legal standards the 
district court applied, and no error is apparent in the district court’s 
choices . . . .197 
Neither Judge Leon, the DOJ, nor even the D.C. Circuit adopted 
Salop’s preferred approach to vertical mergers.  Indeed, the D.C. Circuit 
said: 
[T]he district court found that the quantitative model as presented 
through Professor Shapiro’s opinion testimony did not provide an 
adequate basis to conclude that the merger will lead to “any” raised costs 
for distributors or consumers, “much less consumer harms that outweigh 
the conceded $350 million in annual cost savings to AT&T’s customers.” 
. . . . 
 It is true that the district court misstated that the government had not 
proven that any price increases would “outweigh the conceded $350 
million in annual cost saving to AT&T’s customers.” . . .  The $352 
 
 196. Id. (citations omitted).   
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million . . . was not cost savings to consumers but to AT&T.  But the 
district court did not weigh increased prices for consumers against cost 
savings for consumers, and instead found that the government had not 
shown at the first level that the merger was likely to lead to any price 
increases for consumers because of the failure to show that costs for 
rival MVPDs would increase as a result of Turner Broadcasting’s 
increased leverage in affiliate negotiations after the merger.  Counsel 
for the government and AT&T agree the error regarding the consumer 
savings value alone would not require remand because the district 
court’s opinion was not based on balancing any price increases against 
cost savings to consumers.  Consequently, because the government failed 
to meet its burden of proof under its increased leverage theory at the first 
level, the error regarding cost savings was harmless error.198 
The process the D.C. Circuit blessed was one in which the district 
court first assumed consumer welfare benefits and then looked to the 
government to make a case that corresponding inefficiencies undermined 
the assumed benefits.199  But the government failed to make the case that 
the inefficiencies were cognizable, and the presumption of benefit carried 
the day.200  This is not the standard rule of reason approach applied to 
horizontal mergers.  Here the government conceded—and the court 
accepted—precisely what the defendants would have had to prove 
following a prima facie showing under a traditional balancing test. 
This is not a minor decision.  True, the court did not stop the trial and 
declare judgment for the parties because of the existence of procompetitive 
benefits; this was not a finding of per se legality.201  But, as the D.C. Circuit 
noted above, neither did the court actually weigh benefits against costs; 
rather, it assumed benefits and then, without really doing a balancing, 
determined that the government had not rebutted—and could not rebut—
the presumption of benefit.  Instead: 
[T]he [DOJ’s] loss should come as no surprise to observers when the 
DOJ concedes on the record that the transaction is expected to generate 
at least $350 million in efficiencies annually while its own economic 
expert presents an estimated net harm that, as Judge Leon keenly 
observed, is statistically indistinguishable from zero.202 
At the district court level, this is a thorough refutation of Salop’s 
characterization of the DOJ’s proposed conclusions of law (and Judge 
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Leon’s decision) as adopting an approach consistent with that taken in 
horizontal merger cases.  That it was confirmed without objection from 
the parties and the D.C. Circuit is a rather complete rejection of this claim. 
In his recent presentation at the FTC Hearings, Salop outlined what he 
thinks is a “proper” burden-shifting approach to vertical mergers—of the 
sort he would like to see embodied in new vertical merger guidelines.203  
This approach would require of defendants: 
Defendants may rebut a prima facie case only by showing that 
competitive harm is not “reasonably probable.” 
• Entry must be timely, likely, and sufficient to prevent 
competitive harm. 
• Claimed efficiencies (which arguably cannot ever save a merger) 
must withstand “rigorous analysis.” 
o Defendants bear the burden of their efficiencies 
defense. 
o Efficiencies must be reasonably verifiable, merger-
specific, and likely to benefit consumers in the affected 
markets, and must offset the harms of the merger. 
o The Court cannot credit Defendants’ purported 
efficiencies. 
o A unilateral behavioral promise, such as an arbitration 
offer, cannot rebut a prima facie case.204 
In point of fact, the district court in AT&T-Time Warner rejected 
virtually all of these: 
• It did not require timely entry because it adopted the position that 
the future was uncertain.205 
• It did not demand that the defendants bear the burden of their 
efficiencies defense; rather, it simply credited the efficiencies 
conceded by the DOJ.206 
• It did not weigh the benefits to consumers versus harms to 
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consumers, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out.207 
• And, most overtly, it found that, indeed, the companies’ 
“unilateral behavioral promise, such as an arbitration offer,” 
rebutted the government’s prima facie case.208 
On this last point, the D.C. Circuit validated Judge Leon’s reference 
to the consent order signed by the government in Comcast-NBCU,209 and 
put its own stamp of approval on the role of unilateral arbitration offers to 
alter the analysis in vertical merger cases: 
[In Comcast-NBCU] the government had recognized, “‘especially in 
vertical mergers, that conduct remedies,’ such as the ones proposed [in 
Comcast-NBCU], ‘can be a very useful tool to address the competitive 
problems while preserving competition and allowing efficiencies’ that 
‘may result from the transaction.’”  Like there, the district court 
concluded the Turner arbitration agreements would have “real-world 
effect.” 
 . . . Consequently, the government’s challenges to the district court’s 
treatment of its economic theories becomes largely irrelevant, at least 
during the seven-year period . . . .  [A]nd Professor Shapiro 
acknowledged that taking the arbitration agreements into account would 
require “a completely different model.” 
. . . . 
 . . . Neither Professor Shapiro’s opinion testimony nor his quantitative 
model considered the effect of the post-litigation offer of arbitration 
agreements, something he acknowledged would require a new model.  
And the video programming and distribution industry had experienced 
“ever-increasing competitiveness” in recent years.  Taken together, the 
government’s clear-error contention therefore fails.210 
The D.C. Circuit, like the lower court, found the unilateral promise of 
arbitration to be fatal to the government’s case.211  Perhaps most 
importantly, Judge Leon continually found (and the D.C. Circuit fully 
supported) that changing market conditions rendered the government’s 
contentions unreliable and arguably inapplicable.212  This is not a “neutral” 
presumption, nor is it the sort of anti-vertical-merger presumption 
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proposed in Salop’s slides.  Instead, it is a non-merger-specific 
acknowledgment that puts a thumb on the scale in favor of private actors 
on the assumption that such conduct is presumptively beneficial or 
impossible to refute because information to the contrary is unreliable. 
Indeed, contrary to the argument that Clayton Act Section 7’s 
incipiency standard contemplates a lower standard of proof for the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case,213 it actually seems clear (and correct) that 
error cost analysis would impose a higher burden on predictions of future 
outcomes precisely because they are uncertain.  This is consistent with a 
general presumption in favor of such mergers, not against them.  Of 
course, this does happen in horizontal merger cases, as well; there is, in 
fact, nothing vertical-specific about the skeptical treatment of incipiency 
claims.  In this regard, it is not only appropriate for vertical merger 
guidelines to incorporate a lighter burden, but, arguably. the horizontal 
guidelines should do so, as well. 
V. THE ABSENCE OF ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
FROM VERTICAL MERGER POLICY PROPOSALS 
The feared harms that are typically raised in objection to vertical 
mergers reveal the fundamental flaws in how antitrust practitioners and 
academics frequently view the markets and firms they analyze.  In short, 
they are insufficiently sensitive to dynamic effects or too quick to assume 
that more atomized competition leads to more innovation. 
The crucial question of how a market’s structure affects innovation 
has occupied the world’s brightest economists for almost a century, from 
Schumpeter who found that monopoly was optimal,214 through Arrow who 
concluded that competitive market structures were key,215 to the 
endogenous growth scholars who empirically derived an inverted-U 
relationship between market concentration and innovation.216  Despite 
these pioneering contributions to our understanding of competition and 
innovation, if the past century of innovation economics has taught us 
anything, it is that no market structure is strictly superior at generating 
innovation: “The literature addressing how market structure affects 
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innovation (and vice versa) in the end reveals an ambiguous relationship 
in which factors unrelated to competition play an important role.”217  
Instead, in any given case, the right market structure likely depends on a 
plethora of sector- and firm-specific characteristics that range from the 
size and riskiness of innovation-related investments to the appropriability 
mechanisms used by firms, regulatory compliance costs, and the rate of 
technological change, among many others. 
The economics that describe vertical integration as generally 
procompetitive are not, despite some claims to the contrary, designed to 
prefer monopoly power as a good in itself, but emerge as part of a 
recognition that the boundaries of firms are somewhat arbitrary from an 
outside perspective.  The proper way to generate efficient outcomes is 
determined as much by transaction costs, corporate governance, asset 
specificity issues, and other intangible qualities of firms as it is by the 
static price considerations in narrow product markets. 
Critics of vertical mergers do not often acknowledge the uncertainty 
surrounding the effects of changing firm and market structure on dynamic 
welfare.  Advocates of a strong presumption against vertical mergers base 
their conclusions on analyses largely devoid of dynamic considerations. 
Indeed, as the authors of one study that acknowledges this limitation218 
note, “[g]iven the current state of knowledge, we feel that such [strong] 
presumptions would be unwarranted at present.”219  While there is 
something of a dynamic element to the notion that vertical mergers affect 
horizontal competition by foreclosing entry or raising rivals’ costs, the 
approach does not seem to entail a deep appreciation for the 
entrepreneurial, informational, and other organizational effects of vertical 
integration, which are fundamental to long-term consumer welfare in 
dynamic markets. 
Thus, for example, criticisms of the AT&T-Time Warner merger and 
the district court opinion in the case typically ignore the organizational 
justifications offered for the merger, including the changing market and 
the need for traditional business models to adapt in order to compete.220 
 
 217. Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 22 
(2007). 
 218. Crawford et al., supra note 169, at 894 (“[T]he effects that we document are only partial. 
Most importantly, our model and analysis do not allow vertical integration to influence 
investments . . . .  As emphasized in the literature on investment effects of vertical integration . . . the 
direction of these effects on consumer and aggregate surplus are ambiguous a priori (and remain an 
important topic for future research).”). 
 219. Gregory S. Crawford et al., AT&T/Time Warner and Antitrust Policy Toward Vertical 
Mergers, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., July 2019, at 1, 5. 
 220. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, There’s No Antitrust Case Against AT&T, WALL STREET J. 
 
2020] THE FATAL ECONOMIC FLAWS 965 
[But] even if [vertical restraints] appear to limit distribution, they spur 
the creation of new content and new modes of distribution. Americans 
today are already cutting cords and unbundling their viewing. Multiple 
distribution models, each with a unique collection of content, can ably 
compete. 
 AT&T signed a deal with Taylor Swift to create and distribute 
“behind the scenes” videos. Dish Network’s Sling TV is offering 
“skinny bundles” of select channels. CBS has launched its own stand-
alone streaming service. Amazon is bundling original programming into 
a Prime subscription. Such innovations would not exist without the ability 
to offer exclusive content or unique arrangements to attract customers. 
A merged AT&T-Time Warner, with tighter integration of content and 
distribution, would generate further experimentation and have an 
enhanced ability to compete in this environment.221 
Instead, “the static analysis of the bargaining problem [undergirding 
the DOJ’s case] ignores complexities associated with the dynamic nature 
of the market, complexities that show the merger is efficient and unlikely 
to adversely affect the short run competitive process.”222 
As noted previously, much of the mainstream economics undergirding 
merger analysis is dismissive of organization theory and thus also 
dismissive of many of the “non‐standard and unfamiliar contractual 
practices and organizational structures. . . .  [W]hereas transaction cost 
economics holds that organization both matters and is susceptible to 
analysis.”223  This systematically ensures that orthodox analyses fail to 
account for the organizational structures, processes, and choices 
conducive to generating dynamic welfare. As Professors Jorde & Teece 
note: 
 For innovations to be commercialized, the economic system must 
somehow assemble all the relevant complementary assets and create a 
dynamically-efficient interactive system of learning and information 
exchange.  The necessary complementary assets can conceivably be 
assembled by either administrative or market processes, as when the 
innovator simply licenses the technology to firms that already own or are 
willing to create the relevant assets.  These organizational choices have 
received scant attention in the context of innovation.  Indeed, the serial 
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model relies on an implicit belief that arm’s-length contracts between 
unaffiliated firms in the vertical chain from research to customer will 
suffice to commercialize technology.  In particular, there has been little 
consideration of how complex contractual arrangements among firms 
can assist commercialization—that is, translating R&D capability into 
profitable new products and processes.  The one partial exception is a 
tiny literature on joint R&D activity, but this literature addresses the 
organization of R&D and not the organization of innovation. 
. . . . 
 But in reality, the market for know-how is riddled with imperfections.  
Simple unilateral contracts where technology is sold for cash are unlikely 
to be efficient.  Complex bilateral and multilateral contracts, internal 
organization, or various hybrid structures are often required to shore up 
obvious market failures and create procompetitive efficiencies.224 
Whatever the claimed price effects of increased concentration, if they 
are not accompanied by an assessment of industry-wide increases in 
innovation and of quality improvements that may have accompanied the 
price increases, it is impossible to conclude that they are an indication of 
anticompetitive conduct—or even that they are harmful at all.  Rather, 
price increases accompanied by concomitant or even greater quality 
increases, as well as increased market innovation (that may result in future 
quality improvements), are consistent with consumer-welfare-enhancing 
behavior, and these benefits must also be evaluated before any conclusions 
can legitimately be drawn. 
As Allen Gibby and Geoffrey Manne have noted in the ag/biotech 
context (a decidedly and increasingly oligopolistic industry): 
 While the agriculture industry has a long history of successful cross-
licensing arrangements between agricultural input providers, licensing 
talks can, of course, break down (and do so for any number of reasons), 
potentially thwarting a nascent product before research has even begun–
–or, possibly worse, well into its development.  The cost of such a 
breakdown is not merely the loss of the intended product; it is also the 
opportunity cost of the foregone products Company A could have been 
developing, as well as the costs of negotiation. 
 To mitigate the risks inherent in these arm’s-length negotiations, as 
well as to avoid other impediments to efficient R&D (like delays 
resulting from waiting years for Company B to fully develop and make 
available a chemical before it engages in negotiations with Company A), 
firms may merge to fully integrate their knowledge and capabilities. 
Where these and other impediments may arise, integration may well be 
the lowest-cost way of organizing assets in order to maximize their 
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value.  This is especially true for R&D-intensive industries where 
intellectual property and innovation are fundamental to obtaining or 
maintaining a competitive advantage.  Absent integration, neither party 
would have an incentive to fully disclose the nature of its intellectual 
property and innovation pipeline. Integration can thus increase both the 
likelihood and the efficiency of information sharing, enabling managers 
to effectively evaluate and reorganize assets in ways that maximize 
return on investment.225 
By contrast, a necessary corollary of enforcement policy aimed at 
increasing the alleged competitive effects of indirect competition by 
increasing enforcement efforts aimed at vertical integration226 is the 
imposition of an effective duty to deal upon vertically related firms—
precisely the opposite of the strategic and nuanced forms of organization 
and coordination that innovative markets require.  Put differently, an 
approach that rests on the loss of indirect competition to justify 
challenging a vertical merger must also rest on the existence of that 
indirect competition in the but-for world.  Because such competition (i.e., 
the supply of inputs (access to customers) to all competitors in the 
downstream (upstream) market) cannot be certain to arise, the theory 
implicitly presupposes the imposition of a mandatory duty to deal when it 
does not.  If not, the claimed competitive forces that would be lost from a 
merger relative to the but-for world are not, in fact, necessarily lost. 
The common bias in antitrust is to think about everything in terms of 
product markets, which may (or may not) be appropriate in the context of 
horizontal mergers, but is certainly incomplete when thinking about 
vertical mergers.  Vertical mergers are at least as often about the 
organization of production, especially in high tech markets, where these 
firms are considering strategies to survive future Schumpeterian 
disruption, as well as trying to get R&D right for what consumers want in 
five years. 
Focusing solely on the product market in a vertical merger makes an 
enforcer miss the forest for the trees.  Although competition for the market 
(as opposed to competition in the market) is frequently a crucial driver of 
innovation, it is only tangentially addressed even by current antitrust 
regimes.  Instead, these laws tend to focus more heavily on competition 
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within well-defined markets—that is, on competition in the market.227  In 
that regard, the indicia of competition upon which current antitrust regimes 
tend to focus may, when considered within the context of innovation, point 
in the wrong direction.  Indeed, whereas competition for the market is a 
key driver of innovation, it does not follow that ever-more competition in 
each and every market is necessary, or even desirable, to achieve the 
optimal rate of innovation in an economy.228 
Consideration of dynamic markets entails a very different approach: 
 Thus, indicia for defining high technology markets must focus on 
competitive conditions and competitive activity.  There must be an 
investigation of behavior and actions and generally over a longer time 
horizon than the standard 1-2 years.  Standard indicia, and particularly 
the hypothetical monopolist test, using the SSNIP (at or near a 5-10% 
level) will surely define markets too narrowly.  If it is difficult to 
determine an appropriate SSNIP (whether the “P” is interpreted as 
“price” or “performance”) so that markets can be confidently defined, 
then one can endeavor to assess whether monopoly power exists by 
assessing: 
• innovative activity (e.g., research and development expenditures 
and trends, product innovations and introductions, and 
performance enhancements); 
• competitive activity (e.g., shifts in share, the impact of potential 
entry, shifts in customer purchases); and 
• pricing responses and flexibility.229 
Of perhaps greatest significance, the impact of each organizational 
form on knowledge transfers creates a particularly strong division between 
integration and contract.  As Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu, and Chad 
Syverson point out: 
 That vertical integration is often about transfers of intangible inputs 
rather than physical ones may seem unusual at first glance.  However, as 
observed by Arrow (1975) and Teece (1982), it is precisely in the 
transfer of nonphysical knowledge inputs that the market, with its 
 
 227. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 937, 960 (1981). 
 228. Harold Demsetz, The Intensity and Dimensionality of Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 137, 140–41 (1995) (“Once perfect knowledge 
of technology and price is abandoned, [competitive intensity] may increase, decrease, or remain 
unchanged as the number of firms in the market is increased . . . .  [I]t is presumptuous to conclude . . . 
that markets populated by fewer firms perform less well or offer competition that is less intense.”). 
 229. Christopher Pleatsikas & David J. Teece, The Analysis of Market Definition and Market 
Power in the Context of Rapid Innovation, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 665, 689–90 (2001). 
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associated contractual framework, is most likely to fail to be a viable 
substitute for the firm.  Moreover, many theories of the firm, including 
the four “elemental” theories as identified by Gibbons (2005), do not 
explicitly invoke physical input transfers in their explanations for 
vertical integration.230 
Particularly in the high-tech setting, the role of intangible assets in 
encouraging merger over contracting (and, in turn, the dynamic 
consequences of mergers versus contracts) is both extremely important 
and woefully absent from antitrust law and theory.  As Daniel Sokol has 
written: 
 For the past thirty years, antitrust literature has largely ignored the 
significant literature within strategy related to vertical integration in the 
technology setting.  Overall, this literature shows the important 
efficiency-enhancing effects of vertical mergers.  These mergers are 
largely complementary, combining the strengths of the acquiring firm in 
process innovation with the product innovation of the target firms.  This 
literature helps to push for a presumption for vertical merger law and 
policy to generally tolerate vertical mergers. 
 . . .  Many large firms acquire smaller firms in vertical mergers with 
the belief that the acquisition will allow the acquirer to create efficiencies 
that are not possible merely by licensing, strategic alliance, or joint 
venture. 
 Large firms need acquisitions to help with innovation.  Innovation is 
critical for firms because greater innovation leads to improved financial 
returns. . . . 
 . . .  A number of reasons explain this strategy of acquisition vis-à-vis 
internal growth.  This includes lower entry barriers via acquisition, 
acquisition of intellectual property and research and development 
(R&D) that can be used strategically, knowledge, economies of scale and 
scope, and the ability to exert greater control rights through vertical 
integration via merger rather than via contract.231 
Finally, although difficult to verbalize and often unappreciated by 
managers themselves, successful, innovative businesses are characterized 
by “dynamic capabilities.”  Among other things, these derive from close 
managerial control over a range of inputs and processes internal to a firm: 
[D]ynamic capabilities are about doing the right things, at the right time, 
based on unique managerial orchestration processes, a strong and 
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change-oriented organizational culture, and a prescient assessment of 
the business environment and technological opportunities. . . . 
. . . . 
 Dynamic capabilities reside, in part, with individual managers and the 
top management team.  At certain key junctures, the ability of a CEO 
and the top management team to recognize a key development or trend, 
then delineate a response and guide the firm in its co-creation activities, 
may be the most important element of the firm’s dynamic capabilities.  
But the organization’s values, culture, and its collective ability to quickly 
implement a new business model or other changes are also integral to the 
strength or weakness of the firm’s dynamic capabilities. 
. . . . 
 Because of their deep, enterprise-specific roots, signature processes 
are not so easily imitated by other firms that did not and cannot share this 
history and that may have a different, incompatible corporate culture as 
well.  Moreover, the replicability of a process or business model is often 
confounded, particularly externally, by what Lippman and Rumelt 
(1982) call “uncertain imitability.”232 
Jorde and Teece noted this too, nearly thirty years ago, as a reality of 
multiple coordinate models of relevant markets: the product market, the 
“know how” market and the market for complementary goods.233 
 Indeed, antitrust analysis of complex business arrangements which 
ignores the primacy of innovation will frequently fail.  New intellectual 
paradigms are necessary to understand how competition takes place in 
many industries today.  These paradigms must move beyond a narrow 
focus on market structure as the determinant of competitive 
considerations.  Frames of analysis must be broadened far beyond the 
market structure-conduct-performance paradigm to include 
appropriability regimes, capital markets, the market for know-how, and 
the market for what we will call complementary assets.  Traditional 
market structure analysis will yield reliable results only in limited 
circumstances that have become increasingly rare in today’s global 
economy.234 
The market for “know how” incorporates, among other things, all of 
the intangible assets of a firm that facilitate production, which can to 
varying degrees be considered appropriable as intellectual property.235  
 
 232. David J. Teece, Intangible Assets and a Theory of Heterogeneous Firm, in INTANGIBLES, 
MARKET FAILURE AND INNOVATION PERFORMANCE 217, 228 (Bounfour & Miyagawa eds., 2015). 
 233. Jorde & Teece, supra note 51, at 580. 
 234. Id. at 579-80. 
 235. See id. at 591.  
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When intellectual property protection for a given set of valuable pieces of 
“know how” is strong—easily defendable, unique patents, for example—
firms can rely on property rights to efficiently contract with vertical buyers 
and sellers.236  But in cases where the valuable “know how” is less easily 
defended as IP, trade secrets, or some other legally recognized property 
right—e.g. business process innovation, managerial experience, and the 
like—the ability to partially vertically integrate through contract becomes 
more difficult, if not impossible.237 
Thus, static analysis, while useful, and while it certainly has its place, 
quickly runs into problems when dealing with dynamic firms that create 
ecosystems of products and services that compete with each other. As 
Professor Mark Jamison notes: 
 Competition through innovation and the vulnerability of some tech 
business models make it futile to base antitrust on market definition and 
price sensitivities.  The practices used to define markets and examine 
upward pressure on prices rely on stable products and demand and 
historical data that are directly relevant to making decisions about the 
future.  This reliance is misplaced, as rapid change makes the present and 
past poor representations of the future.  Hauge and Jamison call this 
“decay,” by which they mean that as time passes, facts about the past 
decline in relevance for regulatory action.238 
Jamison is pointing in the right direction in this observation.  He goes 
on to advocate for antitrust analysis to consider what he calls “resource 
fluidity”239 and proposes an interesting framework where enforcers need 
to look at the full life-cycle of a firm and product, from VC funding 
through production iterations, and ultimate profit-taking to determine if 
the firms, considered dynamically, were behaving in procompetitive 
ways.240  It is a valuable and important insight, but even this approach 
needs to be broadened. 
Not only should we look at the dynamics of a particular production 
lifecycle, as Jamison suggests, but we should consider the dynamic 
tensions that exist in the firm as a whole, from supply chain and production 
through management style, culture, and the firm-specific resources and 
talents that impact the competitive decisions in question.  There is a large 
economics and organization theory literature discussing how 
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organizations are structured with respect to these sorts of intangible 
assets.241  And the upshot of all of them is that, while we start—not end, 
as Professor Salop would have it242—with the Coasian insight that firm 
boundaries are necessarily a function of production processes and not a 
hard limit, we quickly come to realize that it is emphatically not the case 
that integration-via-contract and integration-via-merger are always or 
even often viable substitutes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The contemporary complaints about vertical integration are old wine 
in new bottles: much of the ground in recent complaints about vertical 
mergers has been tread over the course of the twentieth century.  
Moreover, empirical research consistently demonstrates that vertical 
mergers are either procompetitive or, at worst, competitively neutral.  The 
possibility theorems offered by opponents of vertical mergers to justify 
invigorated enforcement against them rely on fragile claims that ignore the 
meaningful distinction between contracts and mergers, and between harms 
that are likely to arise via horizontal integration and those by vertical 
integration. 
Perhaps more problematic than merely getting the analysis wrong, this 
crusade against vertical mergers leads us to examine outdated and 
unproductive questions.  The narrow conception offered by those 
advocating for a revolution in antitrust law that would create presumptions 
against vertical mergers threatens to undermine dynamic competition and 
innovation.  Organizational forms aimed at solving strategic management 
problems and aimed at facilitating dynamic competition are overlooked by 
this approach.  Yet competition among modern firms—even (or 
especially) oligopolistic firms in fast-moving, high-tech industries—is 
takes place primarily on this dimension.  These firms operate what 
amounts to product and service ecosystems that compete with other firms’ 
ecosystems along numerous dimensions and across time.  Looking for 
simplistic (and analytically incorrect) stories about structural foreclosure 
 
 241. See, e.g., David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285 (1986); Sidney G. 
Winter, The Logic of Appropriability: From Schumpeter to Arrow to Teece, 35 RES. POL’Y 1100 
(2006); ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 
1992); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996); Henry W. Chesbrough 
& David J. Teece, When Is Virtual Virtuous?: Organizing for Innovation, 1996 HARV. BUS. REV. 65 
(1996); Richard Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy, 57 
J. INDUS. ECON. 526 (2009); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987). 
 242. Salop, AT&T, supra note 40, at 468–69. 
2020] THE FATAL ECONOMIC FLAWS 973 
in static markets leads us to miss the proper evaluation of the dynamic 
competitive effects of vertical arrangements across the broader, more 
complex, evolving markets in which these firms actually operate. 
In this frame, there may very well exist increases in innovation 
(including especially business model innovation) and quality 
improvements along some dimensions, alongside superficial price 
increases or localized constraints on innovation along other dimensions.  
To determine if a particular merger is truly anticompetitive requires a 
careful balancing of all of these considerations against each other.  
Although it may take less cognitive work to look for simple stories in a 
relatively static price analysis in narrow markets, this would ultimately do 
consumers a disservice. 
 
